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Measuring Market Power for Marketing Firms: 
The Case of Japanese Soyabean Markets 
Konomi Ohno and Paul Gallagher1 
Abstract: This paper extends Bresnahan's market power measure, which can be estimated 
econometrically, to marketing firms that have potential for price discrimination. An investigation of 
Japanese soyabean markets during 1973-78 using the model reveals an episode in which Japanese 
importers exercised some market power for several years after the US soyabean embargo of June 1973. 
An analysis of welfare loss and exchange rate transmission is also presented. 
Market Power Coefficients 
The firm's profit-maximizing rule is to set perceived marginal revenue equal to marginal 
cost. In a competitive market, any attempt by a firm to raise prices by supplying fewer 
commodities would result in increased supply by other firms. A single firm thus has no 
market power to influence market prices. Hence, perceived marginal revenue equals price and 
also equals marginal cost. When market power exists, both perceived marginal revenue and 
marginal cost are less than price. 
Bresnahan (1982) argues that market power in an industry can be measured as a 
coefficient, A., in the following relation between price (P) and quantity (Q): 
(1) P = MC - A.Q <JP 
<JQ 
This function postulates equality between perceived marginal revenue and marginal cost. 
When A.= 0, the market is perfectly competitive. When A.= 1, the market is monopolistic. In 
an oligopolistic market structure, A. lies between zero and unity. In a case where inverse 
demand and marginal cost are represented by P = G(Q, Y, a) and MC= C(Q, W, ~),where a 
and ~ are parameters, and while Y and W are exogenous consumer income and wages, 
respectively, then the price relationship becomes: 
<JG (2) P = CCQ, W, ~) - A.Q <JQ (Q, Y, a) 
Treating P and Q as endogenous variables, the demand function and price relationship are 
simultaneously estimated to reveal the market power coefficient, A.. 
However, Bresnahan explains that the degree of market power, A., cannot be identified 
unless an additional interaction between price and income is included in a system of linear 
demand and marginal costs. If a change in the exogenous variable on the demand side, Y, only 
shifts the demand function in parallel, the hypotheses of competition and monopoly are not 
differentiated. 
However, when characteristics of marketing firms and their sales environment are 
recognized, Bresnahan's additional variable can become unnecessary. As an illustration, 
consider a general formulation of the marketing problem. Suppose firms buy from producers 
and sell the product to human consumers and large-scale processors. Further, marginal 
revenues in product markets differ due to differences in demand elasticities and market power. 
Marketing firms' costs rise due to material and processing costs. Costs are also higher for the 
human consumption market, owing to local distribution costs. 
The demand functions are: 
P 1N (3) D1 = CJ.oN + CX1--
CPI1 
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Y:P:+Y;P; Pz MR (4) Dz = Po + P1 - P1-- + Pz-- + PsC 
CPlz CPlz CPlz 
where Di and Pi are quantity demanded and price in market i.z Equation (3) shows that the 
demand for direct human consumption depends on real price and real income. Equation (4) 
tells us that the demand for processing is determined by real margins to process soyabeans 
and rapeseed and the capacity of factories. Perceived marginal revenues, in turn, depend on 
market power and the parameters of the demand functions: 
(5) MR1 = P1 + A.1[Di~~Ii} and MRz = Pz - A.z[Dz~;Iz J 
A general formulation of the cost function specifies material and processing components 
and adjusts processing costs to wages (W): 
(6) C(Q,, Q,J • P "<Q, •Q) • W l [o,<Q, •Q,l• ~ (Q, •Q,+[a,,Q, • ~;' Q,' ll 
where the Qi are marketing firms' outputs for market i. Notice that costs are higher in the 
local market when a 81 1' 0. Also, marginal costs are different and increasing when Ps and Psi 
are positive. 
Pricing relationships for both product markets can be developed from solutions to the 
maximum profit problem for marketing firms. The profit function is: 
This function can be expressed in terms of the Dis by noting that Q1 = D1 and Q2 = D2 + S, 
where S is the change in ending stocks. Then the first order conditions are: 
(8) an = MR 1 - {P*+W[as+PsW1+Dz+s)J+W[a81+Ps1D1ll = O 
aQ1 
The implied pricing functions are: 
(10) P1 = - .!::2_(CPiiDiJ + (0'.5 +0'.8 1)W + <Ps+Ps1J(WD1) + Ps(WDz) + PsCWS) + p• 
0'.1 N 
Az (11) Pz = _(CPlzDz) + 0'.8 W + p5 (WD1l + f3s(WDz) + PsCWS) + P • 
P1 
An econometrically useful form of the marketing system is given by Equations (3), (4), 
(10), and (11). There are 10 endogenous variables and 8 exogenous variables: 
P1N Pz CPfiD1 Endogenous: Pi, Pz, Di, Dz, --, --, ___ , CPlzDz, WD1, and WDz 
CPI1 CPlz N 
YN Ys0 ps0 +Ysmpsm MR 
Exogenous: N, --, , --, C, W, WS, and P • 
CPI1 CPlz CPlz 
The criterion for identifying an equation is that the number of included endogenous variables 
less one must be equal or less than the number of excluded exogenous variables. For instance, 
two endogenous variables are included in Equation (3) (D1 and P/CPI1). Six exogenous 
variables are excluded. Thus, Equation (3) is identified because 1 < 6. Following the same 
rule, Equations (4), (10), and (11) are also identified. Furthermore, A.1 and ~ can both be 
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determined from the first coefficient of the respective price equations and demand price 
response parameters (a1 and p1). Thus, the oligopoly solution is identified for marketing 
sectors with two product markets. 
For subsequent empirical investigations, the capacity adjustments by marketing firms 
should also be included. Now the profit function is: 
(12) rr = P1D1 + PzDz - ~ *CQ1 +Qz)+Was(QT-QT)+ ~s CQT-QT)2+as1CQ1 -Qi)+ P;i CQ1 -Q1l2J 
where QT and Q1 are capacities and QT = Q1 + Q2. Now the pricing functions are: 
A.1 CPI1D 1 P1 = - - --- + (a5 +C1.s1lW + CPs+Ps1)WD1 + PsWDz + PsWS (13) a.1 N 
- PsWQT - Ps1WQ1 + P* 
(14) P 2 = Az CPI2D 2 + a 8 W + ~5WD 1 + PsWDz + PsWS - p5 WQT + P* 
P1 
where (14) is identical to (ll) except one term, -p8 WQT, and there are more additional terms 
in (13) compared to (10). The four equations, (3), (4), (13), and (14), are still identified, as are 
A. 1 and A.z. 
The cost structure of marketing firms is an empirical issue. Short-run marginal cost 
functions could be constant CP5 =0) in both markets when capital stock (handling and storage 
equipment) is fixed and variable costs are proportional to labour and energy used for handling. 
Further, Thompson and Dahl (1979) hypothesize economies of scale in transport, information 
network, risk bearing, and storage space for US grain exporters. As scale of operations 
increases and firms accumulate capital, the marginal cost of marketing firms could decrease 
over longer run periods. The inverse relationship between marginal cost and capacity in the 
above cost function potentially accounts for these long-run cost adjustments. 
Japanese Soyabean Markets 
The two-market assumption is an alternative method to Bresnahan's demand notation for 
identifying the market power coefficients. Soyabean markets in Japan seem well-suited for 
testing this model. There are two primary soyabean usages in Japan. One is for direct human 
consumption as food (tofu, natto, etc.) except oil, and the other is for livestock feeds and oil. 
The former market accounts for 30 percent of all soyabean consumption in the Nation. More 
than 88 percent of soyabeans are imported, with the primary sources being the USA, China, 
and Brazil. Crushing mills are located on the coast to minimize transport costs. Other 
imported soyabeans are unloaded there and sent to urban areas where human consumption 
points are concentrated. 
Point-of-import prices and urban wholesale prices have behaved differently. The unit 
value import price closely follows the US export price adjusted by the exchange rate and 
transport costs. That close relationship suggests that a constant margin model may be 
suitable. Similarly, Tokyo wholesale prices from the early 1970s and post-1979 period closely 
reflect import prices. However, there appears to have been an episode of extremely high 
wholesale prices during 1973-78. Supplies worldwide were short in 1973, and all import and 
wholesale prices increased. However, domestic wholesale prices increased more than 
proportionately and remained high even after world prices declined. This period of high 
domestic prices may have been triggered by the US soyabean embargo, which was in effect for 
5 days from 21 June 1973. Afterwards, export licences were set at 50 percent of unfilled 
export contracts until 1 September 1973 (Kost et al., 1986). 
There was an inventory buildup in anticipation of the embargo. However, consumption 
behaviour was not unusual; i.e., there was a consumption decrease in the presence of high 
domestic prices during the high-price era of the early 1970s. 
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Estimation and Data for the Soyabean Market 
Specification of demand relationships in Japan's soyabean markets and preliminary 
hypothesis testing produced a more precise system of demand and pricing functions. These 
functions are shown below as Equations (15)-(18). 
The demand function for the human consumption market (3) is a per-capita function. 
Population then becomes a scaling factor for independent variables in the market demand 
function, as shown in Equation (15) below. Also, separability for food consumption is assumed, 
so YICPii and Pi!CPii in Equation (3) are the ratios of nominal household expenditure on food 
and nominal soyabean wholesale price to a consumer food price index (Phlips, 1983, p. 73). 
Finally, seasonal trends in soyabean consumption are taken into account with dummy 
variables, one for the second and third quarters and the other for the fourth quarter. 
In market 2, rapeseed margins are included as an exogenous variable in Equation (16), 
since it is expected that soyabeans would be replaced by this important substitute if rapeseed 
profitability increased. A capacity measure is also included as an explanation for the secular 
increase in demand. 
Several preliminary specifications of pricing equations were also examined. In particular, 
the data supported the notion of constant marginal costs for both markets. That is, the 
coefficients ~s and Psi were not statistically significant. With regard to market power, the 
coefficient A.2 was not statistically significant. Similarly, the market power coefficient A.i was 
not statistically significant in some preliminary specifications. However, A.i was found to be 
statistically significant when "an episode" of monopoly pricing between 1973 and the first half 
of 1978 was specified. Hence, Equation (13) is slightly changed as follows: 
CPiiDi (l3 )' Pi = - ~[A.11D+A.iz(l-D)] + (as+<XsilW + <Ps+~silWDi + PsWDz 
+ PsWS - PsWQT - Ps1WQi + p• 
where D = 1during1973-78; otherwise D = 0. 
Then the equations are simultaneously estimated and the hypotheses A.12 = 0, A.z = 0, Ps 
= 0, and Psi = 0 are tested. The x2 is 7. 72, which is less than x2 (4, 0.05). The hypothesis 
cannot be rejected at the 0.05 level. 
A typical system of estimation equations for Japan's soyabean market is shown below: 
aiP1 YN (15) D 1 = a0 N + -- N + a 2-- + a3D23N + a4D4N CPI1 CPI1 
(16) Dz = A + A MS + A MR + A C 
f'O f'l CP/2 f'Z CPI2 f'3 
P __ A.u CPI1D 1 (17) 1 - - --- D + (a8 +<X8 i) W + p• 
o.i N 
(18) P2 = o.8 W + p• 
The variable definitions are given in Table 1. Quarterly data for 1971-88 are used for 
each variable. Most data come from Japanese domestic sources. 
Results 
Table 2 summarizes the empirical results. Two sets of estimates are shown. One is a full 
system while the other is separated. The latter system is added because of concerns about the 
import unit value as an accurate measure of transaction prices in the processing (P2) market. 
Both sets of equations in the tables are similar. Quantities of soyabeans consumed in market 
1 demonstrate a statistically significant negative relationship with relative prices of soyabeans 
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and a positive relationship with household expenditure on food. Statistically significant 
seasonal trends show that direct human consumption of soyabeans is affected by seasonal 
factors, high in the fourth quarter and low in the second and third quarters. Food made from 
soyabeans, such as tofu and aburaage, are largely consumed during the New Year celebrations, 
the most important Japanese holiday, and high expenditure on food during the fourth quarter 
may be supported by the large additional income provided by December bonuses. 
Variable I 
pl 
I 
p* 
y 
c 
w 
Table 1-Definition of Variables 
Definition 
Soyabean use for direct consumption (approximated as domes-
tic production plus imports plus difference in stocks between 
the previous period and the current period minus quantity 
processed) 
Soyabean use for processing into meal and oil 
Change in ending stocks 
Weighted average of wholesale prices of Ja]:JaneseiJ: US, and 
Chinese soyabeans by market shares (P1=P~8MS 8 +P{MSJ 
+P?_Msc, where MS represents market share and superscripts 
US, J, and C respectively represent USA, Japan, and China) 
Unit value of imported soyabeans 
Rapeseed price to large processors 
Soyabean margin (=Y'/,P~+Y";P";-P2) 
Rapeseed margin (=Y~P~+Y'";:P":-PR) 
J yield from one ton of I (meal and oil yields for soyabeans and 
rapeseed are calculated by dividing soyabean oil or meal pro-
duction by soyabean use by processors for every quarter be-
tween the first quarter of 1971 and the fourth quarter of 1988 
and regressed on the time from 1 to 72) 
Wholesale price of I J (I = soyabeans or rapeseed; J = oil or 
meal) 
Export price of American soyabeans, adjusted for freight and 
exchange rate 
Consumer price index for food 
Consumer price index 
Population 
Nominal per-household consumption of food, beverages, and 
cigarettes 
Capacity to process soyabeans for oil or meal calculated from Q 
Nominal wages in food industry 
I Unit 
1000 t 
1000 t 
¥/kg 
¥/kg I 
¥/kg 
¥/kg 
¥/kg 
% 
% 
million 
¥1,000 
million 
1000 t 
¥1,000 
The estimation of Equation (16) shows that quantities of soyabeans processed in market 
2 are positively related to soyabean margins and capacity. There is a negative relationship 
between quantities and rapeseed margins, but it is not significant. 
In Equation (18), the hypothesis that an intercept term equals zero was not rejected from 
Equation (17), a81 1' 0 with t = 7.2. These results specify the cost functions for the Japanese 
soyabean marketing firms. Since: 
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(19) TC = P *CQ1 +Q2l + asWCQ1 +Q2-Qrl + as1 WCQ1 -Q1l 
the marginal cost for each market is constant with marginal cost in market 1 and significantly 
higher than that in market 2. This result indicates that significant handling and transport 
costs are incurred in marketing for human consumption after unloading at the ports. 
Table 2-Estimation Results for Equations (15)-{18) 
Combined System 
Separated System 
Coefficient) Human Consumption [ Processing Variable 
Estimate I t-ratio Estimate j t-ratio [ Estimate [ t-ratio 
ao 0.02385 1.49 0.02172 1.35 
al -0.0046541 -2.58 -0.0043112 -2.38 
az 0.41388 0.17 0.68773 0.29 
a3 -0.0048923 -1.97 -0.0050297 -2.03 
U4 0.01133 2.29 0.01093 2.20 
~o -153.33 -1.61 -146.58 -1.53 
~l 358.72 1.81 283.51 1.42 
~2 81.01448 0.36 96.05749 0.42 
~3 0.98441 12.91 0.98462 12.84 
as 0.00018821 0.18 0.000184 0.18 
as1 0.02122 7.19 
as+as1 0.02127 7.60 
A.11 0.08137 2.53 0.07632 2.35 
Summary Statistics for Combined System* 
R2 DW 
pl 0.62 1.4 
p2 0.87 1.0 
Ql 0.58 2.4 
Q2 0.77 2.4 
*Values for the combined and separated system are the same up to three significant 
digits. The statistically significant A.1 (t=2.53) suggests that market power existed in the 
wholesale market between 1973 and the first half of 1978 and that the market was not 
competitive. The Japanese soyabean markets were segmented, and marketing firms might 
have exercised market power and pursued policies of price discrimination in the two soyabean 
markets during 1973-78.3 
Welfare Analysis and Exchange Rate Transmission 
The market power coefficient A.1 is small relative to its pure monopoly value, but it is 
statistically significant. Profit margins and consumer welfare losses, which are based on 
estimates of demand functions and market power coefficients, are presented in this section. 
Judgments on the importance of this market power episode are enhanced with these 
conventional performance measures. 
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Pricing behaviour and loss of consumer surplus are shown in Figure 1. The MR schedule 
depicts the firms' perceptions of how revenues will change when price changes; it depends on 
A.1. The condition that MR= MC defines the equilibrium price and quantity, P 0 and D0 • The 
competitive solution is also given; as A.1 approaches zero, MR rotates to D. Then the price 
reduces to marginal cost (8) and consumption expands to U. The area of P0 8BA is the 
consumer welfare loss. This area is calculated from the values of P0 , MC, D0 , and De for each 
period from 1973 up to the first half of 1978. 
p 
pD 
0 Q 
Figure 1 
The estimated demand, marginal revenue, and marginal cost functions enable us to 
specify profit margins and to calculate algebraically the loss of consumer surplus. The inverse 
demand, marginal revenue, and marginal cost functions given from Equations (15) and (17) 
are: 
_ CPI 11 D CPI11 (20) P11 - -- 11 + adt• MRt = P11 + "-1-- Dit, MC = (a.3+a.s1)Wi + P; = 81 
a.1Ni a.1Ni 
where: a.dt = - CPI11[a.o+ a.2Yi +a.3Dz3+a.4D4] 
a.1 CPI11 
and t shows that each variable depends on time. Each parameter follows the result in Table 
2. 
The values that define the welfare area can be calculated from the above marginal 
revenue, marginal cost, and price functions. The appropriate prices and quantities are given 
below: 
( ) P o _ a.d1"-1 +81 Do _ (8i-a.d1la.1Ni d D c _ (81-a.dt)a.1Nt 21 1 - , 1 - , an 1 - ~~~~~ l+A.1 (l+A.1)CPiu (l+A.1)CPI11 
Profit margins are measured as (~-8/ I~ for each period. The average was 22 percent. 
The loss of consumer surplus during the period was $376 million, of which $361 million 
were transferred to marketing firms and the rest was wasted as dead-weight loss. 
Exchange Rate Transmission 
Another aspect of competitiveness in the market is the degree to which the exchange rate 
is transmitted to the wholesale price. A perfectly competitive market has an elasticity of 
wholesale price with respect to an exchange rate of unity, assuming that the pricing strategy 
of soyabean exporters is not affected by exchange rate changes (no pricing to the market) and 
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that transaction costs from import points to wholesale markets are fixed. That is, the 
percentage change in the exchange rate is perfectly absorbed by the percentage change in the 
wholesale price. If the yen appreciates against the US dollar by 10 percent, then wholesale 
prices of US soyabeans decline by 10 percent under perfect competition. However, when the 
market is not competitive, a change in the exchange rate may be adjusted by the firm's profit 
margins as well as wholesale prices. So if the yen appreciates against the dollar by 10 
percent, and wholesale prices of US soyabeans decline by 8 percent, then 2 percent is left in 
importers' pockets as their additional profit. 
Suppose the marketing cost (o) includes the product of the export country price and the 
exchange rate, p* = Pe, where p* and P are import prices in yen and in dollars, and e is the 
exchange rate (yen per dollar). Then, any changes in the exchange rate are perceived through 
changes in import prices in yen terms. When the exchange rate changes, the import price in 
yen terms will be affected as well, which will influence importers' marginal costs. Figure 1 
suggests that the level of P0 is determined by a combination of demand, marginal revenue, and 
marginal cost functions. The argument in Equation (21) clarifies that P~ depends on demand 
conditions, marginal cost, and market power. An exchange rate transmission elasticity is 
obtained: 
(22) e ap e ap ao 1 
p ae P a8 Te l+ ad11..1 + (a5 +a8 1)W1 
e1P/ 
where 0 < lo < 1 and pe is the export price of US soyabeans, assuming that US exporters are 
not price discriminating due to a change in the exchange rate (i.e., apelae=O). 
The elasticities from 1973 up to the first half of 1978 were calculated for each period. The 
average is 60.4 percent. Elasticities for the same period with an assumed competitive 
structure (l..=0) are 86.7 percent. The exchange rate transmission was incomplete in 1973-78 
while the yen was in a long appreciating trend against the dollar and relatively stable. The 
small magnitude of the market power coefficient seems to have a relatively large influence on 
the exchange rate transmission elasticity. 
Conclusion 
Bresnahan's method for measuring a market power coefficient was applied to marketing 
firms where an interactive exogenous variable with prices was not necessary. This two-market 
model was tested in the Japanese soyabean market. The data are consistent with an episode 
in which there was market power in the Japanese soyabean wholesale market after the US 
embargo. The estimates suggest that Japanese consumers lost $376 million during this 
episode, most of which was transferred to the importers. Also, the average exchange rate 
transmission was 68.9 percent, which indicates price stickiness in the wholesale market. 
The market power episode ceased in late 1978, and the market has been competitive since 
then. This could be explained by increased domestic supplies and imports of soyabeans from 
China in the late 1970s. Further investigations might focus on the potential role of energy 
costs or marketing risks as factors contributing to the period of unusually high margins. 
Notes 
1Iowa State University. 
2 Additional variable definitions are given in Table 1. 
3The increase in price in the first quarter of 1973 might be due to unusual circumstances. 
The model was tested excluding this observation, but t..1 was still statistically significant. 
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Discussion Opening-Joyce A.S. Cacho (Virginia Polytechnic Institute and 
State University) 
During 1970-88, Japan imported soyabeans from the USA, Brazil, and China. Soyabean 
imports from the USA and Brazil are processed for vegetable oil and protein meal. The direct 
human consumption market is primarily supplied by Japanese-produced soyabeans and 
imports from China. China's soyabeans are closest in variety to Japanese soyabeans. The 
variety differences between soyabeans for feed and food use mean that soyabeans are not a 
homogeneous product in the Japanese market. The US embargo, which was in effect 21-26 
June 1973, would be expected to affect the processing market and have a neutral effect in the 
human consumption market. 
Between 1973 and the first half of 1978, an episode of high wholesale prices for soyabeans 
occurred in Japan. This sustained price level may represent the market power of the firms 
(approximately 10) involved in the for-feed market. In the estimation of the system of 
equations for Japan's soyabean market and testing for market power, the authors include a 
variable to represent this in the equation for soyabeans for food use. Since the demand 
patterns for feed-use and food-use markets are separate and different, the market power 
variable may be included more appropriately in the feed-use equation where market power is 
likely to have occurred after the US embargo. 
The technique developed in this paper to measure market power is methodologically 
sound. In addition to providing an alternative technique to using time-series analysis of 
market power, price in Japan is comprised of US price and the US dollar/yen exchange rate. 
Thus the linkage between the competitiveness of the market and the exchange rate 
transmission may be analysed. However, the application of the technique to the Japanese 
soyabean market and the corresponding results need to be re-examined. The assumption that 
the feed-use and food-use markets are separate but linked is brought into question by the fact 
that a varietal difference E!Xists between the soyabeans supplied to each market. 
{Other discussion of the paper and the authors' reply appear on page 93.] 
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